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The Myth of the Shareholder Revolution and the Financialization of the 
Firm  
This article re-examines the shareholder value revolution of the 1980s to challenge 
the dominant conception of the financialization of the firm. This transformation is 
widely interpreted as a re-alignment of corporate management in response to 
growing shareholder power and neoliberal managerial norms associated notably 
with agency theory. By contrast, we demonstrate how the financialization of the 
firm has its roots in the innovations made in 1960s America by a small group of 
outsider firms, the conglomerates, to challenge the corporate establishment. As we 
show, these firms pioneered financial techniques that profoundly transformed the 
nature of corporate strategy and launched a process of financialization as firms 
began to exploit the leverage financial markets could provide in various corporate 
contests. Taking stock of this historical lineage leads us to re-interpret the 
shareholder revolution of the 1980s. We demonstrate how the key features of this 
era: the orientation of firms towards capital market, the increase in shareholder 
activism, and the rise of agency theory, should be read as unintended outcomes of 




In his influential book, The Transformation of Corporate Control, Neil Fligstein (1990) 
argues that the financialization of the firm should be traced back to the late 1950s and 
1960s. As he later put it, ‘all of the financial forms of reorganization including mergers, 
divestures, leveraged buyouts, the accumulation of debt and stock repurchasing were 
invented or perfected in this period’ (Fligstein and Markowitz, 1993: 193). Various 
authors have followed suit, pointing to the growing financial orientation of firms since 
the 1960s (Zorn, 2004, Lazonick, 1992). By these accounts, corporate decision-making 
became increasingly determined by a financial bottom line, with the activities of firms 
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being judged according to their financial performance.  
These important contributions about the history of corporate governance, 
however, have had little impact on how the financialization of the firm since the 1980s 
has been understood. The paradigmatic political economy contributions on the subject do 
not refer to the earlier developments covered by Fligstein (see O’Sullivan 2001, 
Orhangazi 2008, Aglietta and Rébérioux 2005, Krippner 2005, Roe 2006, van der Zwan 
2014, Lazonick 2014, Mazzucato 2018). Even the few who do, such as Dobbin or 
Fligstein himself, minimize the significance of this early history and reaffirm the view of 
the broader scholarship. As a result, the post-1980 era has too often been misunderstood 
as an attempt to dismantle, rather than build upon, the legacy of this early financialization 
of the firm (see Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley, 1994). From this perspective, the 
financialization of the firm is cast as a shareholder revolution that took place in the 1980s; 
a response to the managerial abuses of the post war era when sprawling and diversified 
multidivisional-form (M-form) companies were built at the ‘expense of efficiency’ 
(Mason 2015; Davis 2011). This decade seemingly marked a turning point, with 
shareholders imposing discipline on managers in the form of new norms of management 
better geared towards serving shareholder interests.  
This article seeks to root more firmly the financialization of the firm and the 
shareholder revolution in the innovations of the 1960s. We take this earlier history of the 
financialization of the firm1 in the United States as an insightful case to gain perspective 
on the social aspects of this transformation.2 As we show, this early history profoundly 
changes the perspective we have on the so-called shareholder revolution that took place 
 
1 While there are some who argue iterations of financialization can be found throughout a 500-
year history of capitalism, the vast majority of the literature on the financialization of the firm 
focuses on developments that have taken place since the 1970s (see van der Zwan 2014).  
2 In Britain, NFCs underwent a similar shift at a similar time but the early financialized NFCs like 
Slater Walker explicitly took inspiration from the American originators (Slater 1978: 91). 
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in the 1980s and early 1990s. We single out more specifically three aspects that are often 
associated with the idea of a shareholder revolution: 1) the re-orientation of corporate 
management towards financial markets, notably with the growing concern with the value 
of shares; 2) the rise of shareholder activism and; 3) the emergence of new managerial 
techniques or templates based on the idea of shareholder value maximization. As we 
argue, these three changes have roots in a longer process and should be considered, in 
fact, as the second phase in a transformation of corporate governance that was initially 
triggered in the 1960s by the arrival of the conglomerates.  
The term conglomerate is now broadly used to refer to a type of firm that 
dominated the 1960s and to highlight the propensity of these corporations to diversify 
through mergers. However, we show that this reading is partly misleading and stems from 
the way corporate governance was later politicized in the 1970s and 1980s. Initially, the 
term conglomerate was used for a different purpose. It referred to emerging firms that 
were characterized by their financialized approach to management. Instead of simply 
focusing on diversification, these firms developed new forms of power based on 
leveraging their operations on financial markets. This fueled an aggressive strategy of 
mergers and acquisitions that became a threat for the corporate establishment.  
While these practices were pioneered in the 1960s, they grew to new proportions 
when they were generalized in the 1980s with the advent of the corporate raiders. We 
show how financialized management then politicized corporate governance with regular 
attempts by managers to mobilize public opinion, regulatory agencies and legal recourses. 
This generated responses by various stakeholders destabilized by the practices of 
financialized management. We argue that it accounts for the rise of shareholder activism, 
the broader struggles over the norms of corporate governance, which involved academics 
and consultants, and the growing concern of established corporations with their financial 
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standings. From this perspective, the shareholder revolution of the 1980s was the 
unintended outcome of political contests among different groups of corporations, rather 
than the product of the external imposition of shareholder preferences on corporate 
America as a whole.  
This historical perspective, we contend, is of great political significance since it 
profoundly changes what we assume to be politically at stake in debates over shareholder 
value. Concerns with shareholders stopping corporations from considering other 
stakeholders has too often played into the hand of executive-level managers, whose vast 
earnings is a key feature of the inequality of contemporary capitalism (Piketty 2017). 
Blaming shareholder demands has too often served to deresponsibilize these managers 
when there is clear evidence they have largely been leading changes in corporate 
governance. Recasting the financialisation of the firm as a process of managerial 
empowerment allows us to redirect the focus for political action onto the actual decision 
makers in corporations, rather than the market environment that supposedly limits their 
alternatives.  
In developing this argument, our aim is mainly conceptual. Following a radical 
historicist approach (see Knafo 2010, Knafo and Teschke 2017), we revisit well-
established historical facts that are too often neglected in this literature in order to draw 
out their implications for the way we theorise the financialisation of the firm. We argue 
that looking at the origins of the financialisation of the firm allows to better appreciate 
the departure that was involved in this process. First, we examine the literature on the 
financialization of the firm to show how a structural bias has led scholars to lend too much 
power to shareholders and underestimate the role of corporate managers as the agents of 
the financialization of corporate governance. The following section makes the case for 
taking a broader historical perspective on the financialization of the firm. As we show, 
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the fact that many of its features were already present in the 1960s, long before the 
shareholder revolution, forces us to reconsider the political economy of financialization. 
We show here that it was associated with new strategies for corporate empowerment that 
became codified ultimately by management consultants in the late 1980s. The final 
section lays out the implications for the way we conceive of the financialization of the 
firm. We do so by showing how each of the three features of the shareholder revolution 
of the 1980s (i.e. the focus on financial markets, the rise of shareholder activism and the 
developments of agency theory) can be better explained as outcomes of the early 
financialization of the firm rather than exogenous factors that structured firms ‘from the 
outside’.  
 
2. A Case of Neglected History: The Early Financialization of the Firm 
 
The concept of financialization appeared in the 1990s on the back of a wave of 
shareholders activism that was hitting corporations. Struck by what seemed at the time 
like a radical inversion of the corporate hierarchy, scholars began to reflect on the 
implications of what they perceived as shareholders reclaiming control from managers 
(Useem 1996; Duménil and Lévy 2004). The notion of financialization was then put 
forward to highlight what appeared as a new approach to management driven by a 
financial rationale. It came to represent what was taken as the takeover of production by 
finance.  
We show, in this section, how this attempt to grasp the novelty of the practices 
that appeared in the 1980s led scholars to downplay previous innovations in corporate 
strategy As a result, what was by the 1990s a relatively established fact - that the merger 
wave of the 1960s had been driven by firms leveraging on capital markets (Espeland & 
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Hirsch, 1990; Fligstein, 1990; Lazonick, 1992, p. 467) - had mostly been written out the 
story. Despite awareness of this early history, it no longer registered in the way scholars 
conceived of the financialization of the firm.  
A good example of this type of framing can be found in what is perhaps the most 
influential account of the financialization of the firm: William Lazonick and Mary 
O’sullivan’s article entitled ‘Maximising Shareholder Value’ (2000). They present the 
shareholder revolution as a response to the crisis of a ‘retain and reinvest model’ which 
dominated the post war era. This was a period, they argue, led by giant corporations which 
retained their resources and re-invested their profits towards further growth. This model 
would have run into trouble in the 1970s when corporations became bloated as they 
reached unmanageable size with too many divisions. Their sprawling structures meant 
that central offices, where strategic decisions were made, grew increasingly distant from 
the units where resources were utilized (O’sullivan, 2001: 110). The result was poor 
decision-making and misallocation of resources. It made corporations less competitive 
precisely at the time when they confronted the rise of Japanese competitors that ate into 
their profit margins.  
According to Lazonick and O’sullivan, shareholders responded to this situation 
by reasserting their interests. With the rise of institutional funds, which concentrated 
equity ownership, shareholders were able to enforce a new ‘downsize and distribute’ 
model of corporate governance that encouraged the systematic liquidation by 
corporations of their non-performing assets so that the returns could be redistributed to 
shareholders and reinvested in more profitable ventures. This agenda prioritizing short 
term results drew support from new neoliberal ideas about corporate governance, such as 
agency theory, that called for greater discipline to be imposed on managers in order to 
ensure that they deliver value to shareholders (Lazonick and O’sullivan, 2000: 16). It 
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legitimated the use of stock options to instrumentalize managers by promising handsome 
benefits to those who served shareholder interests. Those who failed to do so, however, 
would run the risk of seeing the value of their shares plummet making them vulnerable 
to hostile takeovers.  
This reading of the shareholder revolution has proven hugely influential (see for 
example Mazzucato 2018, Mason 2015) partly because of its conceptual clarity. 
However, it reflects the limitations of a structural account that periodize corporate 
governance as a series of dominant ‘models’. Most importantly, it has led Lazonick and 
O’sullivan to underestimate the differences in corporate practices within each of these 
periods. In particular, their retain and reinvest model conflates two types of corporations 
that need to be distinguished in order to grasp the conflicts that animated the 
financialization of the firm: M-form corporations and the conglomerates. The M-form 
corporation was born in the 1920s when an older form of organization based on functional 
units defined by activities (finance, advertisement, sales etc.) was replaced by a structure 
of management based on divisions (defined by products). This shift has often been 
explained by the diversification in the activities of corporations at the time. Since the 
operations of units producing very different things could no longer be realistically unified, 
the solution was to organize management around divisions. It was a new structure of the 
firm that favored a reliance on a financial baseline to facilitate central management by 
making the diverse product lines and divisions of the firm commensurable. By contrast, 
the second type of firm, the conglomerates, represented a more specific group of firms 
that emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s. As we will see, the distinct feature of these 
firms was that they leveraged their operations on financial markets, basically raising huge 
sums through the systematic issue of shares and bonds in order to fuel corporate growth 
through mergers and acquisitions.  
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By subsuming the conglomerates into the broader category of diversified firms, 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan misread key features. They treat the financial innovations the 
conglomerates develop as straightforward strategies of productive diversification that 
typified M-form companies. As a result, they focus on financial accounting, which was 
common to both types of firms, but neglect the crucial difference: the strategy of 
capitalizing on financial markets that was specific to the conglomerates. In fact, they say 
virtually nothing here about capital markets in the pre-1980 era. If anything, corporations 
are depicted as somewhat autonomous from these markets because of their reliance on 
retained profits. As a result, the conglomerates appear as part of what the shareholder 
revolution was reacting against (i.e. the practices of diversified and bloated corporations).  
This conflation also leads Lazonick and O’sullivan to depoliticize corporate 
governance. For in downplaying differences in management practices, they end up 
neglecting the corporate contests that were born out of these differences. As a result, they 
exaggerate the stability of these periods and are thus forced to look elsewhere when 
seeking to explain change. This explains why they rely on ‘external’ factors or structural 
conditions to explain why a model of management emerged. In particular, Lazonick and 
O’sullivan attribute the shareholder revolution to the emergence of a new conception of 
the firm (agency theory) and the rise of new social forces that embraced this new model 
(in particular institutional funds).  
The trappings of such a periodization can be also observed in the work of authors 
such as Neil Fligstein (1990) who have written about the early history of financialization. 
Fligstein bases his account of this process on his notion of the financial concept of control 
(FCC). It emphasizes how financial ideas and templates gained currency in corporate 
governance with the rise of corporate executives who came from corporate finance. 
Particularly important, Fligstein argues, was the portfolio approach to the firm which no 
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longer conceived of the firm as an entity manufacturing and selling products above a 
certain cost but as “a collection of assets earning different rates of return” (Fligstein, 
1990: 239). While this emphasis on the orientation towards financial numbers had been 
recognized by a wide array of scholars, Fligstein went further by showing how these firms 
bought and sold divisions depending on their respective profitability or market shares. In 
this process, Fligstein stressed the particular importance of the acquisitive conglomerates 
in the 1960s: 
‘The most spectacular organizational examples of the new financial conception came 
from firms outside the mainstream of American corporate life. The men who 
pioneered the acquisitive conglomerate (Tex Thornton at Textron, Jim Ling at LTV 
and Harold Geneen at ITT) showed how financial machinations involving debt could 
be used to produce rapid growth with little investment of capital’. (Fligstein, 2001: 
155) 
Despite this promising foray, however, Fligstein stumbled when time came to address the 
shareholder revolution because his periodization made it difficult to reconcile his FCC 
with accounts of the shareholder revolution. Having posited that each period is dominated 
by a concept of control, Fligstein, just as Lazonick and O’sullivan, ended up conflating 
acquisitive conglomerates with the more established diversified firms. Both types of 
corporations were thus subsumed under his FCC which focused, once more, on the 
management of the M-Form and the way ‘finance executives reduced the information 
problem to the rate of return earned by product lines’ in order to make ‘large diversified 
corporations manageable’ (Fligstein 2001: 155). This led to an overemphasis on financial 
accounting and a neglect of corporate activities on capital markets. 
Having made this conflation, Fligstein struggled to reconcile the early corporate 
turn to finance in the 1960s with the shareholder revolution. Fligstein’s conceptual 
struggles to account for the novelty of the 1980s were perhaps best reflected by the fact 
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that he wrote two similar texts, published eight years apart from one another, that arrived 
at opposite conclusions on this tricky question. In the first text, written with Linda 
Markowitz in 1993, Fligstein conceived of the financial reorganization of the 1980s as an 
intensification of the financial concept of control of the 1960s with its short-term focus 
on the profitability of product lines (Fligstein and Markowitz, 1993). This piece 
considerably downplayed changes in the financial concept of control and mostly 
interpreted the 1980s as the generalization of the financial approach which had emerged 
in the 1960s. This argument, however, became increasingly untenable by the 1990s when 
the rise of shareholder value seemed to transform corporate governance in more 
significant ways then initially believed. With more perspective and the rise of shareholder 
value norms of management, Fligstein gravitated towards a more conventional account 
of the shareholder revolution. The cultural background of financially oriented executive 
initially seen as a driver of financialization was now reduced to a simple ‘enabling’ factor 
with the FCC representing now a mere indicator of managers that were ‘receptive’ to the 
new shareholder perspective. Having to account for change meant that once more 
Fligstein was forced to look away from the early financialization of the firm in his attempt 
to make sense of the shareholder revolution.  
Inconsistencies in the way in which the literature conceived of the role of 
managers in the shareholder revolution were perhaps best brought out by the financial 
crisis of 2000-1. With the Enron debacle and the multiplication of stories about the abuses 
of managers, scholars began to question the actual power of shareholders over managers 
(Froud et al, 2006). By then, it was becoming clear that shareholders were failing to 
contain managerial pay and shareholder activism itself seemed to be waning. Even 
Michael Jensen, long seen as an apologist for shareholder value, was then forced to admit 
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that stock options had not succeeded in aligning the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders (Jensen, Murphy and Wruck, 2005).  
In response to these developments, scholars started assigning a greater role to 
corporate managers in the story of financialization (Mazucatto 2018; Krier, 2005). 
Aglietta and Rébérioux (2005) for example, argued that managers had quickly reasserted 
control over the market for corporate governance and largely led the process of 
financialization in their own interest. Curiously, however, this new emphasis seemed to 
change little to the overall story of the shareholder revolution with scholars usually 
casting managers as shareholders in their own rights. In these accounts, the 
financialization of the firm was still explained by the new norms established by agency 
theory and the influence of shareholders. The difference was that now managers were cast 
as complicit in this shift because they had benefitted from the new approach (Jackson and 
Petraki, 2011). The financialization of the firm thus came to be read as the product of the 
new license for managers and shareholders to pillage the resources of the corporations at 
the expense of other stakeholders (Piketty; 2014). Mizruchi (2010), for example, 
reinterpreted the shareholder revolution as a breakdown of the corporate establishment, 
and the various bonds that contained managerial ambitions (notably the waning control 
of banks and unions over corporations). This would have freed managers to pursue self-
enrichment as shareholders (along with other shareholders) at the expense of other 
stakeholders.  
While there is no question that managers have benefitted from these changes, this 
did little to clarify why or how the shareholder revolution had taken place. For the 
growing role assigned to managers in the literature made it unclear whether the 
shareholder revolution represented a means to discipline or liberate managers. It was an 
ambiguity reflected in the wide spectrum of perspective ranging from emphasizing how 
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managers were basically incentivized to serve the interests of shareholders (Ho 2009; van 
Appeldorn and Horn 2007) to highlighting how managers had in fact exploited 
shareholder value for their own interest (Krier, 2005; Froud et al, 2006). What remained 
unclear was why managers had abandoned their old approach if they wielded significant 
power. Struggling to account for the agency of the key players involved, scholars tended 
to gravitate instead towards more structural analysis that continued to put the focus on 
the broad intellectual climate and neoliberal ideas. The rhetoric of free-market 
ideologues, instead of corporate practices, thus took precedence in these perspectives as 
agency theory in particular came to be singled out as a key driver behind the 
financialization of the firm.   
In the following section, we seek to recover the politics involved in the making of 
new norms of management associated with the shareholder revolution. We argue that 
financialization should be analyzed from the perspective of power and re-interpret the 
early financialization of the firm as a product of corporate contests that pitted more 
traditional M-Form corporations to newly emerging corporations that exploited financial 
markets in ways that threatened the corporate establishment. As we will show, the 
financialization of the firm thus had more to do with managerial power struggles shaped 
by the growing importance of financial markets in corporate strategy, than with a new 
model of corporate governance meant to serve the interest of shareholders. 
 
3. Conglomerates and the Financialization of NFCs in the 1960s 
Our central argument is that the financialization of the firm is foremost the story 
of the construction of new forms of corporate power that involved systematically 
capitalizing on financial markets. The exploitation of financial markets for the purpose of 
corporate strategy was pioneered in the 1960s by the conglomerates; a group of firms that 
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found themselves at the center of a political storm. Indeed, the term conglomerate became 
popular in the mid-1960s to describe companies, such as Litton, Ling-Temco-Vought  
(LTV) and Gulf Western whose operations were increasingly oriented towards trading on 
financial markets (Brooks, 1973: 153). Reflecting this history, economic historians have 
often used the term conglomerate to refer to firms that grew rapidly through a sustained 
wave of acquisitions which were powered by financial operations (Berg, 1969). In his 
study of the conglomerates, for example, Robert Sobel highlights the distinct social 
lineage of these corporations, pointing out that they were built almost exclusively by 
outsiders with little previous corporate experience and limited ties to the corporate 
establishment (Sobel, 1984). Similarly, Baskin and Miranti (1997) make a point of 
distinguishing between so-called ‘center firms’ that diversified as part of a strategy to 
pursue economies of scale and scope in the classic Chandlerian mode and the 
conglomerates that capitalized on financial dealings meant to exploit loose financial 
accounting standards and tax rules.  
The practices of conglomerates had significant antecedents that go back to the 
1920s and the early post war era, but they coalesced in the 1960s into a distinct business 
model. This decade was marked by the dramatic increase in diversifying mergers with 
acquiring firms venturing in entirely unrelated industries. The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) reported that 80% of the mergers that took place in between 1965 and 1975 
involved such diversifying mergers (Gaughan 2011: 44). Of great importance here was 
that a significant group of firms used these mergers in financialised ways. They 
systematically leveraged their operations on financial markets to raise capital and 
exploited the bull market conditions of the time to make capital gains. Essentially, they 
created mechanisms for turning promises about future performance into current capital 
they could use immediately for financial transactions, and which they deployed mostly 
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for the purpose of corporate growth through acquisitions. In this way, they were able to 
create a seemingly virtuous cycle whereby ever-growing acquisitions could be financed 
by issuing more securities backed by their widening trove of assets or by selling assets 
captured through these acquisitions.  
This conglomerate strategy based on aggressive acquisitions led to power 
struggles that opposed the new contenders to the corporate establishment, With their 
complex financial maneuvers, conglomerates were perceived as a threat to the US 
corporate establishment and generated a strong political response. Numerous regulators 
in the late 1960s spoke out against conglomerates and expressed their concerns regarding 
what they saw as new forms of management driven foremost by financial, rather than 
productive, considerations. This was the view repeatedly voiced, for example, by the 
Federal Trade Commission and taken up by Hamer Budge, the chairman of the SEC, who 
complained in 1969 about the accounting manipulations of conglomerates geared towards 
financial transactions (Greiman, 1970: 711). The controversial nature of these firms can 
be further gleaned from the fact that separate investigations into the activities of 
conglomerates were conducted by the SEC, the NY stock exchange, the FCC, the FTC, 
The House Ways and Means Committee, The Department of Justice, The Interstate 
Commerce Commission; The Cabinet Committee on Price Stability; The Senate Antitrust 
and Monopoly Subcommittee and The House Anti-Trust Subcommittee (Espeland & 
Hirsch, 1990).  
The controversial nature of the conglomerate’s practices stems from four features 
that defined what we have called elsewhere a financialized approach to management 
(Knafo & Dutta, 2016). The first feature, and what most concerned the corporate 
establishment, was the numerous and aggressive corporate acquisitions made by 
conglomerates which fueled their dramatic growth. Between 1961 and 1968, five of the 
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largest conglomerates (GuIf & Western, LTV ITT, Teledyne and Litton Industries) 
bought 341 firms with assets exceeding $7.9 billion (Espeland and Hirsch, 1990: 81). The 
reliance on extensive financial leveraging meant that ultimately no one could feel safe 
from such acquisitions. Strikingly, the merger and acquisitions of the 1960s represented 
the first wave in which it was no longer uncommon for smaller firms to take over bigger 
ones by mobilizing the resources offered by financial markets (Gaughan, 2011: 44; 
Steiner 1975). A particularly spectacular and much-publicized case was the failed attempt 
by Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation to capture the venerable Chemical 
Bank. There was indeed something shocking about an eight-year-old firm, with only $400 
million in assets, and managed by a young Saul Steinberg, trying to capitalize on its 
highly-valued shares to capture one of the most important banks in the US that managed 
$9 billion in assets (Brooks, 1973: 228). The takeover collapsed, partly because regulators 
and bankers refused to support Leasco, an outcome that was interpreted at the time as a 
closing of the ranks within the establishment to stop a troubling pattern (Goolrick, 1978: 
78).   
 
 
There was nothing reassuring for the establishment in the fact that these firms 
seemed more interested in financial opportunities than productive synergies (Hyman, 
2012). A 1971 report by the House Anti-trust Subcommittee that was investigating the 
activities of America’s largest conglomerates lamented the fact that ‘financial 
considerations and not productivity goals were dominant motivating forces in the postwar 
merger movement’ (in Raw, 1977: 225). This suggested to observers at the time that there 
was no limit to the wheeling and dealing of these conglomerates which were seemingly 
aligning acquisitions irrespective of the size of their targets because the goal was never 
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to properly integrate them in their own operations. Conglomerates such as Litton, LTV, 
Gulf and Western or Textron, became some of the biggest industrial concerns in America 
despite few of them having a positive track record at the level of their productive 
operations. Ninety percent of the growth between 1961-68 of a firm such as Teledyne, 
for example, could be accounted for by its 125 acquisitions during this period (Winslow, 
1973: 2). The main strategy of conglomerates was to target undervalued assets that could 
be redeployed to further improve the standing of a firm on financial markets or turned 
into profitable trades down the line. LTV, for example, targeted complex multidivisional 
firms on the grounds that there was often a big gap between the relatively low value of 
the shares of these corporations and the value of their assets. This would then make it 
easy to spin off assets from the targeted firm to pay for the acquisition (Brown, 1999).  
Conglomerates also made acquisitions in the pursuit of strategic resources. They 
became increasingly interested in financial firms that would provide the resources in cash 
to fund their operations. For example, insurance firms became a privileged target in the 
late 1960s because they sat on large cash surpluses, as mandated by federal regulations 
(Brooks, 1973: 234). Bringing these firms under an unregulated holding company was a 
means to free up these reserves and deploy them for further acquisitions (Winslow, 1973). 
The financial orientation of the conglomerates went beyond their strategic 
interests in undervalued assets. A second contentious aspect of their practices was that 
their managerial strategies (i.e. within the firm) were geared towards financial markets. 
In contrast to traditional M-form companies which focused on product lines and their rate 
of returns, conglomerates restructured the firms they captured with an eye to maximize 
their ability to further tap capital markets. Corporate divisions were not mainly valued in 
terms of their product lines and operations, but in terms of their assets and potential 
impact on financial markets. They were thus managed according to opportunities on 
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capital markets. This could mean pursuing policies that would be well-received on the 
stock market or adopting strategies to maximize the possibilities for capitalizing on 
financial markets. The use of subsidiaries which could issue their own shares or debt was 
particularly important in this respect (Prechel 1997; Krier 2005: 8). LTV, for example, 
became famous for reorganizing its divisions as a means to increase exposure on capital 
markets and its ability to tap these markets for further acquisitions. 
A third feature of the conglomerates was their reliance on great levels of 
indebtedness. The stock market offered the great pay off for financialized management, 
but it was debt that provided the financial muscle required to pursue their acquisitive 
strategy. This is why the financial commitments of conglomerates soon came to be seen 
as disproportionate when compared to their actual capital. Whereas the debt of Gulf & 
Western had represented 30% of its net worth in 1960, it grew to 150% of net worth by 
1968 (Winslow, 1973: 60). This prompted strong criticisms for the gimmicky tactics of 
these conglomerates that often issued complex securities to pay for other firms ; forms of 
debt that were derogatively referred to as ‘Chinese paper’ because their trade value was 
difficult to determine (Bruck, 1988: 38). Regulators were unnerved to see conglomerates 
unlocking a seemingly virtuous (or vicious) cycle by which their ever-increasing size 
made it possible for them to raise more and more cash. It resulted in a delicate balancing 
act revolving around the ability to balance cash flows by capturing assets on the stock 
market and using them as a basis to secure further financing. 
The fourth feature of financialized management was the growing accounting and 
tax manipulations which were associated with the conglomerates. While this has often 
been attributed to a moral decay of managerial standards that arose with the 1980s raiders, 
it is arguable that this trend was more directly connected to the imperatives of 
financialized management. There was growing pressure on conglomerates to cover their 
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liabilities and perform on capital markets. This meant that they were often pushed to 
stretch their books to keep their good standing on financial markets. Their use and 
manipulations of Earnings Per Share (EPS) figures to inflate their achievements became 
particularly controversial. For example, conglomerates often merged with firms that had 
a higher EPS to ‘artificially’ raise their own EPS without making any significant changes 
to their operations (Madrick, 1987). Supporting this technique was the accounting method 
of pooling that inflated earnings by registering as a cost only the market value of the 
assets of an acquired firm, rather than the actual cost paid for the acquisition, which was 
frequently higher (Grieman, 1970). By recording the difference as goodwill to be 
amortized later, conglomerates were able to defer the costs of their assets in ways that 
inflated their earnings.  
All these innovations forged a new form of financialized management that led 
conglomerates to manage their firms through the lens that financial markets afforded 
them. Their legacy, however, has often been downplayed because these conglomerates 
declined dramatically in the 1970s. Having sparked controversy and ridden the waves of 
booming financial markets to forge their growth-by-acquisition business model, the 
conglomerates were vulnerable to a turn in financial markets. When, in the 1970s, the 
equity market turned sour the conglomerates went down with it. Laden with debt and 
underperforming assets they struggled to respond to depressed financial markets. As a 
result, the term ‘conglomerate’ acquired a new significance in the 1970s. It became a 
symbol for what had gone wrong with corporate America where self-interested managers 
had constructed bloated, sprawling and needlessly diversified firms. Yet, as we argue, 
these practices were revived in the 1980s to great effect. In fact, we argue below that the 
financialization of the firm in the 1980s was a product of the spread of the conglomerates’ 
practices rather than a response by shareholders to the failures of Corporate America. 
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4. Financialized Management and the Shareholder Revolution  
As we have pointed out, many of the innovations which became associated with 
the 1980s were pioneered in the 1960s. From a historical standpoint, this is not 
particularly controversial. As we have pointed out, Fligstein (1990), (among others 
(Espeland and Hirsch 1990, Krier 2004)), has already insisted on a similar point. 
However, this literature has struggled to reconcile the history of the conglomerates in the 
1960s with that of the shareholder revolution of the 1980s because it often misinterpreted 
this early history. Having conflated the conglomerates with the dominant M-form 
corporations, scholars read the early innovations of the 1960s simply as means to 
diversify when they reflected in reality a more profound shift in the object of strategy. 
This misreading made it difficult to connect this history to the shareholder revolution, and 
more often than not, scholars presented the 1980s as an abrupt reaction against the legacy 
of the 1960s. In the process, they lost track of the innovations of the conglomerates when 
conceptualizing the financialization of the firm.  
In response to this blind spot we have gone back to the history of the 
conglomerates in order to make a conceptual point. The financialization of the firm was 
born out of the way in which the conglomerates developed new forms of empowerment 
by exploiting capital markets as a means to leverage speculative strategies and finance 
aggressive acquisitions. But what to make of the shareholder revolution then? Can we 
account for the profound transformation of corporate governance that it wrought while 
still acknowledging its roots in the transformations of the 1960s?  
In this last section, we demonstrate first that each of the three features associated 
with the shareholder revolution (the focus of corporations on financial markets; the rise 
of shareholder activism; and the development of shareholder templates of management) 
should be interpreted as unintended outcomes of the rise of financialized management in 
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the 1960s. In doing so, we show that the shareholder revolution marked a further step in 
the financialisation of the firm, not only because it perfected the tools of financialized 
firms, but also because it politicized corporate governance and forced in the process the 
corporate establishment to grapple more directly with financialized strategies. For in an 
age of growing financial resources, it has become increasingly clear that financial markets 
can offer a decisive resource, in the form of readily accessible capital, to determine the 
outcome of various corporate contests.  
4.1 The Turn of Corporation towards Financial Markets 
Perhaps the defining feature of the shareholder revolution is the fact that a wide 
range of corporate managers in the US became primarily preoccupied by their standings 
on financial markets. This is the point where we come closest to the literature on the 
shareholder revolution. This development has rightly been interpreted as the product of 
the threat posed by the market of corporate control in the 1980s with the rise of hostile 
takeovers. In particular, the literature has pointed to the emergence of corporate raiders 
who preyed on firms that performed poorly on financial markets.  
While these facts are not controversial, it is interesting to highlight how this 
development is often reduced to its structural features. Corporate raiders have indeed been 
commonly cast as the guard dogs of shareholder interest pouncing on flagging 
corporations that failed to heed the demands of shareholders (see for example, Dobbin 
and Zorn 2015). This reading relies on a curiously narrow reading of the role of corporate 
raiders in this story. For these raiders are rarely treated as agents in their own rights, being 
mostly analyzed as the embodiment of market forces, or more specifically as the threat 
that obliged firms to meet the competitive demands of the market. From this perspective, 
firms that did not meet those standards would thus see shareholders go elsewhere, thus 
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depreciating the value of their shares and making these firms vulnerable to the attacks of 
corporate raiders.  
Corporate raiders, however, were managers in their own right. Just like the 
conglomerates before them, they leveraged on financial markets as a means to capture 
other firms. While it is true that they legitimated their actions in the name of shareholders, 
their concerns were primarily managerial. At stake was a matter of gaining control over 
firms and capturing assets, not simply exerting voice or threatening exit to influence 
managers. As the conglomerates of the 1960s, they represented outsiders who used 
financial strategies to compensate for their corporate weakness in ways that destabilized 
the establishment. Both borrowed from a rhetoric about the merits of takeovers to shake 
stodgy management into action. In the process, both made great use of debt, depended on 
new forms of financing, and looked for ways to cash in on financial markets. More 
specifically, both relied on a business model that involved costly financing which could 
only be sustained if one treated an acquisition as a set of assets to be managed foremost 
with an eye to balancing future cash flows and cashing out down the line through further 
financial transactions.  
These similarities are not coincidental since many of the corporate raiders of the 
1980s had been part of the conglomerate movement in the 1960s (Saul Steinberg, Carl 
Lindner, Meshulem Ricklis, the Tisch brothers) or connected to it in one way or the other. 
The capacities they displayed in capturing and gutting firms had been honed over two 
decades and perfected with the development of various financial instruments (most 
notably junk bonds) (see Knafo and Dutta, 2016). They reflected a mode of empowerment 
and a transactional logic which was associated with financialized management (Krier 
2005). It was a point that was recognized in the late 1980s with Espeland and Hirsch 
(1990) correctly pointing out that these raiders represented the culmination of the 
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techniques of financialized management pioneered by the conglomerates in the 1960s 
(See also Krier 2005: 44). However, this important conceptual link, we pointed out, got 
lost in the 1990s as scholars began to conceive the financialization of the firm as a 
shareholder revolution.    
As we will show, the rise of corporate raiders was important because it forced the 
corporate establishment to take financialized management more seriously and re-
articulate their corporate strategies in relation to financial markets. As a result, their 
standing on financial markets became a dominant preoccupation. But perhaps the biggest 
legacy of the raiders was the rise of the Leverage Buy-Out (LBO) firms, or what became 
known as private equity firms. These firms radicalized the strategies of financialized 
management initially developed by conglomerates. Interestingly, even Michael Jensen 
himself admitted that LBO firms resembled the conglomerates with their many divisions 
and business units and their aim to cash in on later financial transactions (Jensen, 1989: 
15). However, he dismissed this similarity on the grounds that LBO managers are subject 
to various incentives which ensure that they perform well. In other words, unlike the 
conglomerates, they were ‘accountable to financial markets and shareholders’. This was 
a largely ideologically driven point. For the reality is that LBO firms bought out 
shareholders and took public corporations private. In that respect, they represented the 
opposite of what we often take to be the pro-shareholder climate of the 1980s. Far from 
cultivating a shareholder capitalism, they shielded their firms from shareholders to gain 
managerial leeway and freely capitalize on the corporations they captured.  
The LBOs firms were important because they maximized the advantages of the 
financialized strategies developed by conglomerates, while cutting out its liabilities. 
Indeed, the great challenge for conglomerates was to reflect in share prices the value of 
their own accumulated assets. The more they accumulated assets, the bigger the gap often 
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was between these assets and their nominal value as reflected by the firm’s share price. 
As a result, conglomerates risked becoming themselves targets for other raiders who 
would disassemble these multidivisional firms to cash in on the assets. One response for 
financialized managers was to go private with a takeover by buying all the shares so as to 
shield these financialized firms from both oversight and the risk of losing control. It has 
produced a new modality of financialized management that has since seemed unstoppable 
with private equity firms controlling by 2017 around $2.8 trillion in assets  (McKinsey 
2018). The success of LBO firms represents a powerful piece of evidence of the staying 
power of the innovations made by the conglomerates.  
4.2. Shareholder Activism and the Politicization of Corporate Governance  
This brings us to the second feature of the shareholder revolution that we identified in the 
introduction: the rise of shareholder activism. Scholars have seen the shareholder 
revolution as a product of shareholders being frustrated by low returns in the wake of the 
crisis of the 1970s. Their mobilization would have then provided the impetus behind the 
financialization of the firm. Yet one problem with this thesis is that shareholder activism 
emerged quite late in the process. It is usually dated back to the mid-1980s when 
financialization was well under way. It is no surprise then if most discussions about 
activism focus on how financialization was enforced, rather than created. By contrast, we 
argue that the reason for this lag is simply that the historical chain of causation runs 
counter to what is usually presented: it was financialized managers who shaped 
shareholder interests to their own purpose, rather than the other way around as it is too 
often assumed in the literature (see for example Lazonick and O’sullivan 2000).   
It is a curiously neglected fact that the conglomerates, usually presented as the 
main target of shareholder ire, initially appeared on the scene as champions of shareholder 
interests. Indeed, they put much effort into appearing attractive to shareholders long 
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before the shareholder revolution of the 1980s. It should come as no surprise that the 
financialized conglomerates developed well-rehearsed discourses targeting shareholders. 
Being reliant on financial markets meant that they depended on investors for mobilizing 
the capital they needed to capture companies. As Brooks points out, in referring to the 
conglomerates of the 1960s, ‘never before had a company’s reported earnings per share 
meant so much in terms of its stock-market price’ (Brooks, 1973: 156). To support their 
position in financial markets, they needed to publicize their rationale and the benefit of 
their strategies. Litton industry, for example, was famous for building a narrative about 
acquisitions in new technology sectors that played well on Wall Street and fueled the 
rising value of its shares (Sobel, 1984: 74).  
This highlights one of the key features of the financialization of the firm launched 
by the conglomerates: its vital role in politicizing corporate governance. Having to raise 
financial resources and force takeovers meant growing publicity and sustained efforts by 
conglomerates to mobilize shareholders behind their managerial projects or visions. Their 
strategies often involved managerial contests in which they had to appeal directly to the 
shareholders of another corporation in order to force the hand of its managers. Proxy 
fights, for example, meant convincing shareholders that new managers would be better 
equipped to serve them rather than the incumbent managerial team. Already back in the 
1950s and 1960s, it became a common narrative for predatory managers to criticize 
managers from firms they targeted for their inefficiency in an attempt to sway 
shareholders. This strategy was also used to put pressure on managers to agree to a 
merger. By the 1970s, takeover bids would regularly appeal to the management of a 
targeted firm to uphold its duty to shareholders and accept a cash tender with high 
premiums on shares (Madrick 1987). Managerial contests were thus often waged ‘in the 
name of shareholders’. They were increasingly mediated through courts, as the takeovers 
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became more and more hostile, with both sides appealing to shareholder interests to 
further their cause.  
One may assume that this essentially served the interests of shareholders, but we 
should be careful not to essentialize these interests. For managers played a big role in 
helping to formulate the options opened to shareholders. And indeed, financialized 
management teams often showed more inclination in mobilizing shareholders for their 
own ends than in genuinely committing to serve these shareholders. The well-
documented manipulations of the conglomerates in the 1960s was a harbinger for the vast 
leveraging of the 1980s. In both cases, managers proved willing to take on highly risky 
strategies often at the costs of their own shareholders. And, indeed, studies show that 
shareholders from targeted firms generally did much better than shareholders from 
acquiring firms led by financialized managerial team that supposedly championed 
shareholder rights to legitimate their acquisitions (Mueller, 1977; Stearns and Allan, 
1996: 700).  
It is true that an important consequence of this trend was that shareholders did 
find more room to exert influence over management, and that this created the space for 
the growing shareholder activism that became associated with financialization in the late 
1980s and 1990s. Yet shareholders largely defined their priorities in response to 
financialized management. Their interests were shaped by a process of financialization 
already under way and which did not emanate directly from shareholders’ supposedly 
inherent preferences. It is striking, for example, that shareholder involvement in corporate 
governance was initially motivated by a desire to ensure that the gains made by corporate 
raiders would be spread among all shareholders. This concern was at the heart of many 
of the early minority shareholder rights won in courts from the late 1970s onwards. 
Shareholders were initially shunned by corporate raiders in their various financial dealing. 
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In particular, there was great resentment directed at greenmailing, the practice or 
corporate raiders that consisted in buying shares and threatening to launch a takeover in 
order to force a targeted firm to buy back the raiders’ shares at a much higher price. For 
example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (hereafter ‘Calpers’), long 
seen as the organization leading the wave of shareholder activism, started to mobilize in 
response to a case of greenmailing in 1984. As the biggest shareholder of Texaco, it grew 
frustrated at the sight of the firm buying back two million of its own shares from the Bass 
brothers for a sum of $1.3 billion. By contrast, Calpers could only sell their shares at 2/3rd 
of the price received by the Bass Brothers (Barnard, 1991: 1144). In response, Calpers 
decided to mobilize for equal rights to shareholders in order to make sure that the gains 
made by financialized managers would be spread to all shareholders.  
This alignment of shareholders with financialized managerial practices can also 
be seen in the fact that shareholders mainly campaigned in the 1980s to facilitate 
financialized management by attacking the various defensive measures developed by 
corporations against hostile takeovers. Their main concern was not performance per se. 
Instead they resented corporate measures such as the use of poison pills, classified boards 
that staggered the directorships of the board and supermajority antitakeover amendments 
which required a 2/3rd majority for approving a takeover (Gillan & Starks, 2007: 15). 
These were all measures that hindered the strategies of financialized managers. It reflects 
again how the interests of shareholders were shaped by the practices of financialized 
management rather than frustrations with low returns. 
That shareholders have gained handsomely in the era of shareholder value and 
joined in on the spoils of financialized management is without question. Yet the evidence 
is much weaker, if not contrary, when it comes to the impact of shareholder agency and 
their ability to drive change. An extensive literature on shareholder activism shows a 
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relatively limited, even if not insignificant, ability for shareholders to control managers 
(Gillan and Starks 2007). For example, the push to promote a new agenda around 
corporate performance in the early 1990s proved to be relatively disappointing (Froud et 
al, 2006). Not only did the motions voted by shareholders often turned out to be overly 
general and easy to circumvent for managers, it also proved difficult to mobilize diverse 
groups of shareholders to counter managerial power. As a result, many of the most 
powerful shareholders quickly reverted back to more informal and indirect methods 
which involved informal negotiations rather than outright pressure. This relative 
weakness was demonstrated by various studies that found little correlations between 
shareholder involvement and corporate performance or outcomes to investors 
(O’Sullivan, 2000; Gillan and Starks, 2007). 
The historical evidence about the shareholder revolution thus suggests that 
shareholder activism should be read as a response to the financialization of the firm rather 
than its initial driver. As we argued, the lineage of financialized management offers a 
better historicized account for why shareholders became more prominent by contrast to 
structural accounts that simply reads it as a product of shareholder discontent resulting 
from falling profit rates. It also gives us a better sense of how shareholder interests were 
shaped in response to the challenges and opportunities offered by financialized 
management instead of naturalizing these interests. 
4.3. Managerial Practices and the Norms of Shareholder Value 
This leads us to the last of the three transformations which came to be associated with the 
shareholder revolution: the new managerial templates and metrics associated with 
shareholder value. This often constitutes the pivotal point in accounts of the 
financialization of the firm. For if the previous two elements addressed above (the 
growing focus on financial markets with corporate raiders and shareholder activism), are 
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meant to tell us about the interest and market pressures that shaped corporate activity, it 
is usually norms around shareholder value that account for the actual practices of 
financialized management. More specifically, scholars often mention the role of agency 
theory, which is seen here as the neoliberal approach to corporate governance that 
promoted pro-shareholders norms of corporate governance (Davis 2009).  
By contrast, we show here that agency theory was never the ‘exogenous force’ 
that it was later made out to be, an account which lends too much influence to an academic 
discourse that largely lagged behind changes in corporate governance. Instead, we argue 
that the more important discursive and cultural changes did not stem from the rise of 
agency theory, but from management consultants who translated the financial orientation 
of the conglomerates into templates for the corporate establishment with new shareholder 
metrics. 
Agency theory was born out of an academic project to legitimize the use of 
economics for studying corporate governance (Butler & Ribstein 1989). Previously, Berle 
and Means (1967) had made an influential case for thinking about corporate governance 
in political and institutional terms. Writing in 1932, they argued that corporate managers 
had gained great autonomy from market oversight (and more generally public 
accountability) because shareholding was being dispersed across a much wider range of 
owners. This made it difficult for shareholders to mobilize and control managers and 
posed complex issues of accountability since managers seemed to be increasingly 
shielded from market pressures. For this reason, Berle and Means rearticulated the 
question of managerial accountability in political terms, essentially advocating for legal 
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and political expedients to be used in order to counter the economic power of managers 
(Aglietta and Rébérioux, 2005).3  
In response to this view, agency theorists aimed to recast the question of corporate 
governance as an economic issue (Fourcade and Khurana, 2017). For this, they needed to 
show that managers were still subject to market-based mechanisms of accountability 
(Ribstein, 2008). This would then justify using market mechanisms, or an ‘economic’ 
approach, as an explanatory tool in opposition to the institutional concerns of a more 
political approach to the corporation. To make this point, agency theorists borrowed from 
financial theory the idea that capital markets should be treated as barometers for 
managerial performance. Share prices were taken here as reflecting the quality of 
management. Poor management, for example, would depress shares of a firm and invite 
takeovers by more successful firms. Recognition of this market for corporate control was 
important since the threat of takeovers could be interpreted in this framework as a proof 
that managers were still subject to a market logic, contrary to Berle and Means’ claim. 
The same could be said, agency theorists argued, about corporate structures. A market for 
corporate control could also be taken here as proof that the delegation of power to 
managers would be done in economically efficient since the effectiveness of the contracts 
structuring corporate governance would also be reflected in share prices.  
While agency theory put forward a clear academic project, it was not a clearly 
defined political project that can be held to have carried the shareholder revolution. For 
one, the historical record shows little sign before the late 1980s of agency theory having 
much influence on corporate governance. As Heilbron & al point out (2014: 9), there are 
 
3 This gave birth to a managerial theory of corporate governance that emphasises corporate growth 
and managerial autonomy. While this literature pointed to how stock prices is a concern for 
managers who fear takeovers, but it was somewhat downplayed as secondary to the drive for 
corporate growth (Marris 1998). Singh further argued that size was more important in limiting 
takeovers rather than the maximisation of profits (1971).   
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few mentions of agency theory in either corporate documents or the business press before 
1987.  
More importantly, agency theory evolved in inconsistent ways historically. 
Agency theorists were often forced to make discursive contortions in order to recast a 
sequence of contrasting developments as all being the product of the same logic of  market 
efficiency. The main proponents of this approach thus took on rapidly changing positions 
as the reality of corporate governance shifted dramatically during this period (Henwood, 
1996). Most strikingly, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 357) initially described the American 
corporation with its distinctive separation of management from ownership as an efficient 
outcome of markets and an effective solution to the problem of agency. A decade later, 
however, Jensen was calling for the end of the corporation (Jensen, 1989) when the rise 
of corporate raiders seemed to point ‘market rationality’ in a different direction; arguing 
that this form of organization was not responsive enough to the market. The reactive 
stance of agency theorists suggests that it would be more appropriate once more to invert 
the usual chain of causation when thinking about the relationship between agency theory 
and the financialization of the firm. For in many ways, it was Jensen who jumped on the 
bandwagon of financialized management and adjusted his ideas accordingly, rather than 
the opposite.  
It is noteworthy in this regard that one of the main building blocks for agency 
theory, and certainly its key rhetorical element, was fleshed out in the 1960s by Henry 
Manne to actually justify the conglomerates. The Chicago School law scholar wrote then 
in support of the wave of takeovers taking place. Manne had been impressed by Louis 
Wolfson, an early takeover entrepreneur who launched a series of hostile takeover 
justifying his actions on the grounds that stodgy management was hurting corporations 
and holding shareholders hostages (Sobel, 2000: 15). This was an argument that would 
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be often used by the financial conglomerates when involved in contentious, near-hostile, 
mergers. As we pointed out, conglomerates tried to legitimate their takeovers by 
emphasizing the managerial ineptitude of the firms they targeted and calling upon the 
interests of their shareholders to ascent to this acquisition. Manne saw in Louis Wolfson’s 
notorious actions, much publicized because of the various lawsuits he faced, a potential 
solution to the problem of agency identified by Berle and Means. This led him to 
formalize this rhetoric and make the case that a liquid market in corporate control would 
encourage more efficient managing (Ribstein, 2008). By enabling dissatisfied 
shareholders to sell their shares in a company deemed to be badly managed, the price of 
these shares would fall, inviting a takeover by a more efficient corporation (Manne, 
1965). In that way, Manne argued, just as Jensen later did, that the market for corporate 
control was the key to making managers accountable. But in the 1960s, this argument 
was used to defend the very conglomerates that Jensen would later decry in the 1980s!  
In challenging the idea that agency theory defined the normative context for the 
financialization of the firm, we do not deny that norms did play a significant role in the 
shareholder revolution of the 1980s. But the fact that agency theory mostly lagged behind 
financialized management, borrowing many key themes from the conglomerates and the 
corporate raiders, suggests that we need to look elsewhere when it comes to considering 
the role of norms in the process of financialization. More important than the academics 
of the Chicago school, we argue, were the management consultancies that were directly 
connected to the corporate establishment. In fact, the ideas that shaped the era of 
shareholder value were partly formed by a fringe of this consultant world that developed 
ideas and templates linked to the idea of shareholder value long before the so-called 
shareholder revolution.  
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Particularly important here were, two of the main architects of shareholder value, 
Joel Stern and Alfred Rappaport who developed conceptual foundations for thinking 
about corporate strategy in financialised ways. Although they used the rhetorical motif of 
shareholder value, their main intentions were to address managerial concerns. Take EVA 
(Economic Value Added), the first and most famous metric used to articulate shareholder 
value. It was developed by Stern and Stewart, a management consultancy firm whose 
founders worked previously for a management consultancy arm of Chase Manhattan. The 
roots of EVA go back to the attempts of Joel Stern to develop a more effective template 
for managerial decisions making based on capital productivity. Stern had studied at the 
University of Chicago and essentially attempted to translate the emerging financial theory 
for managerial purpose, but he went on a different course than agency theorists. He was 
driven by the intuition that corporate finance should have a more fundamental say in the 
operations of the corporations. He thus believed that value creation was to be assessed in 
the light of various alternatives for investments and measured in terms of its impact on 
financial markets. As Stern later recalled, he was trying to develop a more solid basis for 
managerial decision-making than traditional accounting that was geared towards financial 
reporting (Stern 2003).  
It is no coincidence if Joel Stern developed his ideas in the late 1960s, precisely 
at a time when the conglomerates were in full flight. It reflected a growing concern with 
changes in corporate finances and the new possibilities they opened to corporations. In 
this context, Joel Stern convinced management at Chase Manhattan to set up a 
management consultancy which would provide financial advice to corporations. But 
working for the corporate establishment, Stern then conceived of his approach in reaction 
to the practices of the conglomerates. In particular, he criticized the privileging of 
earnings, as a bottom line for management. His idea of the net cash flow, which anchored 
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EVA, was elaborated in the late 1960s to reconceptualize management around flows of 
capital in and out of a corporation. It spoke directly to the way in which firms position 
themselves on capital markets and conceive of what was valuable in terms which 
privileged financial markets as a base line for corporation management. 
However, resistance to Stein’s ideas in the 1960s and 1970s remained strong 
partly because his premise that financial markets should be integrated more 
systematically, as a parameter for management, had limited appeal to the managers of big 
corporations. It was often perceived at the time as a superfluous concern for established 
managers comfortable with the resources at their disposal. Marginalized in the bank, Stern 
had to leave ultimately Chase Manhattan because of what he felt was a lack of support; a 
move which was prompted by the decision of officials in the bank to put Stern in a back-
office position (Stern, 2003: 4).  
Things began to change with the growing importance of mergers and acquisitions 
in the late 1970s. In this context, the financial template of management associated with 
these authors took on a new importance. The emerging threat posed by corporate raiders 
to the establishment made it increasingly necessary for corporations to manage more 
actively their relationship to financial markets. The new managerial templates thus 
became a privileged channel through which the lessons of financialized management 
were translated for the corporate establishment; a process that would play a big role in 
the making of the great stock market bubble of the 1990s. It contributed to the further 
financialization of the firm as a process of managerial empowerment.  
Joel Stern illustrates the distinct trajectory of these managerial consultants seeking 
to use the tools of financial theory learned from his days at the Chicago Business school 
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to support corporate managers in their forays onto financial markets.4 While these 
consultants made references of shareholder value as a means to rethink the corporation 
from the perspective of financial markets, their analytical templates had little to do with 
a commitment to shareholders. This is why they were never willing to take the turn in the 
1980s of siding with shareholders against managers as Jensen did. This should not 
surprise us. After all, management consultants have a strong interest in defending the 
objectivity and commitment of those they serve, the corporate managers. Few remark on 
this tension between the champions of shareholder value and the main proponents of 
agency theory, yet this casts the turn to shareholder value in a different light. For if agency 
theory, ‘sided’ with the pioneers of financialized management (initially Henry Manne 
with the conglomerates in the 1960s and later Michael Jensen with the corporate raiders 
in the 1980s) the management consultants helped organize the counter attack by the 
establishment. For this reason, shareholder value should not be read as an extension of 
agency theory even if they share a common theoretical lineage. Joel Stern (in Stern and 
Willet, 2014), in fact, criticized Jensen for believing that managers would or could exploit 
the corporation for their own ends. As he argued, there were too many checks within the 
firm for this to be possible. Similarly, another influential consultant, Alfred Rappaport, 
(1989) responded to Jensen’s famous article announcing the end of the public 
corporations, by insisting that the problem was not one of form (i.e. the public nature of 
the corporation), but of the tools they had at their disposal (chasing the wrong bottom 
line).  
5. Conclusion 
This article proposed a different conception of the financialization of the firm through a 
 
4 The same point could be made about Alfred Rappaport (See Knafo and Dutta, 2016: 784) 
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re-examination of the shareholder value revolution of the 1980s and early 1990s. We 
showed how scholars have too often focused on the normative commitments invoked by 
champions of shareholder value to justify their actions, instead of the new managerial 
strategies and capacities that corporate managers built to purse them. As a result, these 
scholars often end up surprisingly close to what is now the mainstream interpretation 
associated with agency theory. By presenting the shareholder revolution as an attempt to 
impose capital market discipline on corporate managers and satisfy the interests of 
shareholders, they essentially reproduce a reading of the so-called shareholder revolution 
that is similar to that of the leading agency theorist, Michael Jensen. While the literature 
on financialization may be critical of this outcome, too little is done to challenge Jensen’s 
idea that the shareholder revolution was an attempt by the owners of capital – the 
shareholders – to wrestle back control of companies from ‘unaccountable’ managers. As 
a result, scholars of the financialisation of the firm end up normalizing these changes as 
the outcome of market competition, they reify shareholder interests as a straightforward 
matter and they considerably exaggerate the ability of the market to generate new norms 
of management.  
By contrast, we have demonstrated how the conglomerates pioneered techniques 
of financialized managerialism that later became the bedrock of the shareholder 
revolution. By developing strategies and techniques to leverage their corporation on 
financial markets, they found dramatic tools of empowerment that profoundly rocked the 
corporate establishment. This led us to propose a political account of the financialization 
of the firm which emphasizes the conflict between two groups of corporations, rather than 
the broad structural conditioning that would have shaped corporate management in 
general.  
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Taking stock of this historical lineage demonstrates that we need to invert the 
causal links usually invoked to explain the shareholder revolution. For it was the politics 
unleashed by the rise of financialized management that produced the constellation of 
factors that are now associated with the financialization of the firm. Indeed, the growing 
emphasis on how firms perform on financial markets, the growing involvement of 
shareholders in corporate governance and the evolution of norms and managerial 
templates associated with this ‘shareholder revolution’, were all products of the ways in 
which various agents responded to the unsettling rise of financialized management.  
This argument is of great significance for both analytical and political reasons. 
Analytically, it suggests that more work needs to be done on the way in which financial 
practices were mobilized for the ends of corporate strategy, and on the innovations that 
helped reshape the very nature of corporate strategy. Reformulating the history of the 
financialization of the firm as a process of corporate empowerment helps to better grasp 
the evolution of corporate strategy. It also opens the door for a richer historicizing of 
financialization by delineating different phases in the political conflicts unleashed by 
these new forms of power, of which the rise of the conglomerates and the shareholder 
revolution represent only two. Finally it poses important questions about the ways in 
which these new tools and strategies of corporate empowerment were translated to 
different environments around the world, to fit others forms of corporate governance with 
their own distinct strategies of growth and empowerment.  
Politically, the concern over the financialization of the firm stems from the 
inequitable consequences it has for other stakeholders, especially workers, and its impact 
on so-called ‘patient’ strategies of investments (Deeg and Hardie, 2016). Unfortunately, 
the idea that shareholders have stonewalled ‘social’ initiatives meant to make 
corporations more responsible to diverse stakeholders has played into the hands of 
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corporate management. Indeed, managers too often placate critique by invoking the 
constraints imposed by shareholders. In the process, decision makers are systematically 
made unaccountable for the strategies they pursue. To recognize that corporate managers 
have a greater responsibility in this process can thus help refocus the target of political 
movements and policy initiatives. Without dismissing the importance of shareholder 
pressures, this paper suggests that the more significant challenge is to confront 
financialized managerialism itself and the way in which financial markets have 
empowered corporate management.  
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